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With great depth of understanding The Status Quo Crisis traces the current financial crisis
and its management, highlighting crucial gaps at international level. Among the abundant
literature already published on the crisis, this exciting book stands out as the first to analyze
the weaknesses of international interventions and explain why the world economy remains
susceptible to another crisis. The title of the book provides, in a nutshell, a summary of its
content. It examines the major global financial governance reforms seeking to prevent a
repeat of the global economic and financial crisis. Its thesis is that these reforms have kept
the world economy in a status quo situation. Eric Helleiner explains how continuity
characterizes the world economy and how we remain in an ongoing crisis.
When the crisis began there were expectations for renewed management of the
worldwide financial sector and in developing international macroeconomic policies to
prevent another crisis, especially through “macroprudential regulation”. Four important
decisions reinforced these optimistic expectations. The G20 leaders’ forum was to take
leading role in world crisis management. There was an intent to reduce the role of the US
dollar as the world’s dominant international currency. Third, there was an effort to change
the market-friendly character of international financial regulation. Finally, the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) was created to act as global economic governance.
Unfortunately, none of these developments turned out to be as significant as intended or
initially hoped for. The book argues that these four measures failed, in large part, for
reasons that are political in nature. Five years after the financial meltdown, the
international landscape languishes in the same condition as before the crisis began. G20
management of the crisis created only a limited demand for funds because of the stigma
involved in seeking such funds. The US dollar remains the dominant world currency; in
fact, dominance of the dollar was strengthened by the crisis. Market-friendly international
financial standards were not significantly changed because of the dominance of the
ideology of free markets. Finally, the FSB had a limited ability to overcome the political
powers of individual nations.
After US real estate prices declined in 2006, international trade and financial flows
declined sharply, leading to a global financial crisis. By the summer of 2007, financial
institutions linked to subprime mortgages faced huge losses. Confidence in financial
markets was further eroded by the Northern Rock bank run and when Bear Stearns ran into
trouble. The Lehman Brothers collapse worsened the situation and led to a panic in global
financial markets. Interconnections between financial institutions, and the possibility that
the collapse of one institution could lead to collapse of several others, attracted the
attention of regulators around the world.
This was extraordinary moment and an opportunity for renewal. Joseph Stiglitz declared
that it could be a new “Bretton Woods moment” referring to the 1944 conference that
established the post-war international financial order.
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The book explains why the four decisions enacted after the fall of Lehman Brothers
were not as effective as expected.
The G20’s leaders’ forum as financial crisis manager was concerned to provide
macroeconomic stimulus programs supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
lending capacity increase. However, the IMF was rendered less important by Fed
intervention, acting as international lender of last resort in many countries. Above all, the
role of the G20 in coordinating monetary and fiscal policies is questionable as each
government responded more to domestic political pressure rather than to global measures.
The role of Fed as world lender of last resort also contributed to the failure to weaken the
US dollar as the dominant world currency. But the dollar mainly appreciated because
demand for dollars and T-Bills increased. Uncertainty about global financial management
encouraged the purchase, by governments and the private sector, of securities denominated
in US dollars. On the other hand, the ability of the Euro to challenge dollar predominance
was constrained by the outbreak of the European debt crisis after 2010.
Market-friendly international financial standards were not overturned despite various
international regulatory reforms. This was mainly because of the political influence
of private financial interests that favored maintaining market-friendly regulation. Macro-
prudential philosophy could and did justify stronger regulation, but a free-market mentality
prevailed.
The FSB was a new international institution created in the wake of the 2008 crisis.
Unfortunately, it lacked formal power to set international financial standards because
membership in the body created no legal obligation to adhere to the standards
recommended by the body. FSB pronouncements could be and were ignored. Enacting
post-crisis international financial reforms was therefore slow and uneven. Some difficulties
stemmed from factors preventing implementation of international standards before the
crisis, including competitive pressures and lobbying by large financial institutions.
National politicians have long been reluctant to accept international constrains on their
policy autonomy. They always find good reasons for keeping regulatory power in their
own hands. This was reinforced by disappointing results of G20 and the FSB efforts to
negotiate cooperative cross-border arrangements. As such, nation states remain the key
pillars of global economic governance in the financial regulatory realm.
In sum, a number of factors contributed to the failure to enact fundamental reforms after
the outbreak of the crisis. The economic weakness of Europe strengthened the economic
dominance of the US dollar. Financial interests and neoliberal ideology influenced
international policy choices. This, in turn, led to ineffective actions by key international
bodies such as the IMF, the G20 leaders’ forum and the FSB.
The book ends with a glimmer of hope that the crisis will generate positive long-term
effects. Four possible future scenarios are set forth, two of which are desirable:
strengthened international institutions and greater cooperation among countries. Its central
message is that greater cohesion among political actors worldwide is necessary to revive
the economy.
This is an essential book for those wanting to discover the origins of the recent financial
crisis and why international organizations have failed to resolve the underlying problems
with our financial system. It provides an unconventional guide through the maze of the
measures taken to contain the crisis.
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